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Abstract
Trading algorithms that execute large orders are susceptible to exploitation by order anticipation
strategies. This paper studies the influence of order anticipation strategies in a multi-investor model
of optimal execution under transient price impact. Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
is established under the assumption that trading incurs quadratic transaction costs. A closed-
form representation of the Nash equilibrium is derived for exponential decay kernels. With this
representation, it is shown that while order anticipation strategies raise the execution costs of a
large order significantly, they typically do not cause price overshooting in the sense of Brunnermeier
and Pedersen.
The microstructure of financial markets has received much attention. Advances in economic and
mathematical theory have made it possible to drop the assumption of “perfect” financial markets, where
trading is frictionless and liquidity infinite. At the same time, the rise of high-speed algorithmic trading
makes it increasingly important for investors and regulators to understand market microstructure and
be aware of the influence that transaction costs and liquidity have on the profitability of trading
strategies and on the stability of financial markets.
Liquidity is particularly relevant for investors who must buy or sell large amounts of a financial asset
over a relatively short period of time. Trading large amounts in one piece can be prohibitively expensive
or even impossible. For large US stocks, the total volume of orders available in the limit order book at
any given time is only about 1% of daily trade volume (Bouchaud et al., 2009, p. 19). Hence a large
order must usually be split into so-called child orders that are executed over the given time period.
In practice, the placement of child orders is typically handled by execution algorithms. These algo-
rithms, including the popular VWAP (volume weighted average price, see for instance Cartea and
Jaimungal, 2015), are often based on the observation that price impact depends on the relative size of
an order: Price impact is smaller when markets are busy. A simple execution algorithm might exploit
this fact by trading every thirty seconds over the course of one trading day, placing large positions
when market volume is high and small positions when market volume is low; while ensuring that
the liquidation constraint is satisfied by the end of the day. The major weakness of such a simple
algorithm is its predictability. Opportunistic investors with access to high-resolution data of financial
markets (e.g., the entire limit order book) can detect the algorithm and reverse-engineer it to predict
its future trading behavior. Then they can pursue an order anticipation strategy: Trade in the same
direction as the algorithm, but a little earlier; then wait until the execution algorithm has traded and
clear inventory directly afterwards. This strategy—also known as front-running—turns the execution
algorithm’s price impact into a predictable source of profit.
Order anticipation strategies require sophisticated detection algorithms (Hirschey, 2016) and a quick
alternation of buy and sell orders. Thus they are typically associated with high frequency traders, for
instance by the Securities and Exchange Commission (2010). Notice however that order anticipation
strategies do not require the breathtaking speed which is necessary for “true” high frequency strategies
such as stale order sniping or non-designated market making (MacKenzie, 2011).
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That order anticipation strategies have been described as aggressive (Benos and Sagade, 2012), preda-
tory (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005) and “algo-sniffing” (MacKenzie, 2011) suggests that the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (2010) is not alone in suspecting that they “may present serious
problems in today’s market structure” (p. 3609). Indeed, Tong (2015) reports that “one standard de-
viation increase in the intensity of [high frequency trading] activities increases institutional execution
shortfall costs by a third” (p. 4).
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) even suggest a direct connection between order anticipation strate-
gies and financial breakdowns. They argue that front-running amplifies the price drop caused by a
large sell order, an effect known as price overshooting. This might trigger further sell orders (e.g., from
pending stop-loss orders), which are again subject to front-running, causing further price overshooting
and, ultimately, a complete market crash.
Even with high-quality data, empirical studies cannot perfectly identify order anticipation strategies
in the market. This is why it can be helpful to study them in a theoretical model. This paper
analyzes order anticipation strategies in a multi-investor model of optimal execution under transient
price impact. Special consideration is given to Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2005) claim that order
anticipation strategies cause price overshooting.
The single-investor case of optimal execution under transient price impact was studied by Bouchaud
et al. (2009) and Obizhaeva and Wang (2013). Both assume that price impact decays exponentially,
an assumption also made by Lorenz and Schied (2013) and Schied and Zhang (2017). Larger classes
of decay kernels and their compatibility with absence of price manipulation are studied by Gatheral
(2010), Gatheral et al. (2012) and Curato et al. (2017). Jaisson (2015) and Alfonsi and Blanc (2016)
link price impact with order flow modeled by a Hawkes process; in this view, changes in the market
price result from changed expectations about order flow imbalance.
If more than one investor trades, the problem of optimal execution can be analyzed with tools from
game theory. Multi-investor models of optimal execution include Carlin et al. (2007), Schöneborn and
Schied (2009), Carmona and Yang (2011), Moallemi et al. (2012), Schied and Zhang (2015), Lachapelle
et al. (2016), Cardaliaguet and Lehalle (2017) and Huang et al. (2017).
The model in this paper belongs to both areas of research: It features transient price impact with gen-
eral decay kernels and an arbitrary number of investors. Optimal execution strategies are characterized
by Fredholm integral equations of the second kind, similar to Gatheral et al. (2012). This observation
also has wide-ranging implications in the single-investor case (Schied and Strehle, 2017).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the model and shows existence and uniqueness
of a Nash equilibrium. Each investor obtains his equilibrium strategy by solving a Fredholm integral
equation of the second kind.
Section 2 derives a closed-form representation of equilibrium strategies under the assumption that
transient price impact decays exponentially.
Section 3 provides an economic analysis of order anticipation strategies based on the closed-form
representation obtained in the previous section. One investor liquidates a sell order, and n opportunistic
investors pursue order anticipation strategies to benefit from the liquidating investor’s price impact.
The influence of opportunistic investors on the liquidating investor’s optimal strategy and expected
costs is studied. Furthermore, the claim by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) that opportunistic
traders cause price overshooting is tested. For many choices of parameters, it must be refuted. In
fact, opportunistic investors often produce the opposite effect and reduce the price drop caused by a
sell order. There are two possible explanations: Price overshooting does not occur if price impact is
transient and sufficiently short-lived; or price overshooting is prevented by quadratic transaction costs.
Section 4 proposes an extension of the model in which opportunistic investors have additional time to
build up and unwind positions before and after the liquidating investor trades.
All proofs are in Appendix A.
1 Existence of a Nash equilibrium
Consider a continuous time market for a single financial asset. The asset is traded by n+ 1 strategic
investors over a time period [0, T ]. In the absence of strategic trading, the asset price S0 is modeled as
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a right-continuous martingale on a filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) satisfying the usual
conditions. Assume that F0 is P-trivial.
The strategic investors i = 0, 1, . . . , n control their instantaneous rate of trading αi(t) dt. A positive
sign of αi(t) corresponds to a buy order. Each investor i must trade a fixed net amount xi until time T .
Consequently, a square-integrable function αi is called an (admissible) strategy (for investor i) if it is
progressively measurable and satisfies the liquidation constraint
∫ T
0 αi(t) dt = xi.
Define the remaining net amount Xi(t) := xi −
∫ t
0 αi(s) ds. In terms of Xi, the liquidation constraint
reads Xi(T ) = 0. Notice that αi and xi together determine Xi and vice versa. Therefore, an absolutely
continuous function Xi : [0, T ] → R will also be called an admissible strategy if Xi(0) = xi and αi :=
− ddtXi is an admissible strategy.
Every strategic investor impacts the asset price. Price impact is assumed to be linear and transient and
is modeled via a square-integrable decay kernel G : [0,∞) → [0,∞). Suppose the strategic investors
pursue strategies α := (α0, α1, . . . , αn). Similar to Gatheral (2010), the asset price evolves according to
S(t) = S(t;α) := S0(t) +
∫ t
0
G(t− s)
n∑
i=0
αi(s) ds. (1)
Investor i’s costs from price impact are
∫ T
0 αi(t)S(t;α) dt. In addition, each investor i incurs quadratic
transaction costs γi2 αi(t)
2 dt, where γi ≥ 0. Notice that the model explicitly allows for different levels
of transaction costs for different investors. In single-investor models, transaction costs of this form may
be interpreted as costs arising from temporary price impact (Almgren, 2003; Bouchaud et al., 2009). It
is tempting to follow Huang et al. (2017) in using the same interpretation for models with two or more
investors. But this is incorrect: If an order generates temporary price impact at time t, it affects the
execution price of every order subsequently executed at the same time t. It therefore becomes necessary
to model the chronological order in which trades arriving at the same time are executed. One might
also choose to apply the same costs from temporary price impact to all orders arriving at the same
time, as in Carlin et al. (2007). But notice that the probability of being executed first (and thus the
probability of being subject to temporary price impact from other investors) generally depends on the
number of investors. This must be taken into account when comparing models with different numbers
of investors. In any case, the transaction costs γi2 αi(t)
2 dt only affect the investor who caused them
and cannot be viewed as costs from temporary price impact. They should be interpreted as general
costs arising from market frictions (Gatheral, 2010, p. 751) or a transaction tax (Schied and Zhang,
2017). See Kissell et al. (2004) for a comprehensive overview of transaction costs on financial markets.
In total, investor i has the following costs of execution:
Ji[αi |α−i] :=
∫ T
0
(γi
2
αi(t)
2 + αi(t)S(t;α)
)
dt, (2)
where α−i := (α0, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αn).
Assume that each investor is risk-neutral and therefore minimizes expected costs of execution. Inte-
gration by parts shows that, for a given right-continuous martingale S0, the term
E
[ ∫ T
0
αi(t)S
0(t) dt
]
= −xiS0(0)− E
[ ∫ T
0
Xi(t) dS
0(t)
]
= −xiS0(0)
is the same for all admissible strategies αi. Hence there is no loss of generality in assuming that S0(t) =
0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Notice that this would be very different if traders were risk-averse (Almgren and
Chriss, 2001).
Assume further that all model parameters, including n and x := (x0, x1, . . . , xn), are known to each
investor. This is a standard—though often implicit—assumption in models with fixed liquidation
constraints (Carlin et al., 2007; Schöneborn and Schied, 2009; Carmona and Yang, 2011; Schied and
Zhang, 2017). Two notable exceptions are the discrete time models in Moallemi et al. (2012) and
Choi et al. (2015), where investors try to derive each other’s liquidation constraint from the evolution
of the asset price. This introduces a new strategic component: An investor might trade little in the
beginning (or even make a feint and trade in the wrong direction) to deceive others. Modeling private
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information requires a sophisticated information structure: Each investor has his own filtration and
updates his guesses throughout time in a Bayesian manner. At the time, such an information structure
seems unavailable for continuous time models.
The function α∗ = (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n) is called a Nash equilibrium (in the class of admissible strategies)
if for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n, the strategy α∗i is admissible, and E[Ji[α∗i ;α∗−i]] ≤ E[Ji[αi;α∗−i]] for every
admissible strategy αi for investor i. In this case, α∗i is called an optimal strategy (for investor i).
Furthermore, α∗ is called a Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies if each strategy α∗i is
deterministic, and Ji[α∗i ;α
∗
−i] ≤ Ji[αi;α∗−i] for every deterministic admissible strategy αi for investor i.
Remark 1. The current analysis limits itself to (stochastic) open-loop strategies αi(ω, t), instead of
closed-loop strategies
αi
(
ω, t, α0(ω, t), . . . , αi−1(ω, t), αi+1(ω, t), . . . , αn(ω, t)
)
.
In closed-loop Nash equilibria, investors still react optimally if another investor departs from equilib-
rium. In open-loop Nash equilibria, this is typically not the case; each investor implicitly assumes
that all other investors will pursue their respective equilibrium strategies. Carmona and Yang (2011)
show that this affects the equilibrium itself: An open-loop Nash equilibrium need not be a closed-loop
Nash equilibrium and vice versa. Closed-loop Nash equilibria are an appealing concept, but notoriously
difficult to find. See nonetheless the aforementioned paper for numerical simulations of open-loop and
closed-loop Nash equilibria in a model of optimal execution under temporary price impact. For a de-
tailed discussion of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in the context of stochastic differential games,
see Section 2.2 in Yeung and Petrosjan (2006).
Notice that the decision to search for open- or closed-loop equilibria is independent of the information
structure of the model. In particular, a closed-loop equilibrium might still rely on the assumption that
all liqudation constraints are known to each investor.
Not every decay kernel G is sensible from an economic point of view. Suppose there is only one
investor i = 0 and assume for simplicity that γ0 = 0. The investor’s costs from price impact are∫ T
0
α0(t)S(t;α0) dt =
1
2
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)α0(t)α0(s) dsdt. (3)
If there is a strategy α0 that makes (3) negative, the decay kernel G admits price manipulation in
the sense of Huberman and Stanzl (2004): The investor can exploit his own price impact to generate
arbitrarily large expected profits. Gatheral (2010) points out that price manipulation strategies do not
constitute classical arbitrage because their profitability is affected by random fluctuations in the asset
price. They belong to the larger class of statistical arbitrage strategies which on average earn excess
returns. Notice the difference between price manipulation and order anticipation: A price manipulation
strategy generates profits from its own price impact, an order anticipation strategy generates profits
from another investor’s price impact. Alfonsi and Blanc (2016) explore the connection between absence
of price manipulation and absence of opportunistic trading in more depth (Corollary 5.4).
If (3) is nonnegative for every α0 ∈ L2[0, T ] and every T > 0, then G is said to be of positive type
(Mercer, 1909). Assume from now on that G is of positive type.
In models of optimal execution under transient price impact without transaction costs, impulse trades—
i.e., jumps in Xi—are optimal if transaction costs are zero (Gatheral et al., 2012; Obizhaeva and Wang,
2013; Schied et al., 2017). But in the current model, such jumps are inadmissible as Xi is required to
be absolutely continuous. This suggests that no Nash equilibrium exists as soon as γi = 0 for some i.
Assume from now on that γi > 0 for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n. This assumption can be weakened in the
single-investor case, see Schied and Strehle (2017).
Under these assumptions on G and γi, uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium is a simple consequence of the
convexity of the cost functionals Ji. The following results are easily adapted from Schied et al. (2017).
Uniqueness should be understood as uniqueness B([0, T ])⊗ P-almost everywhere.
Lemma 2 (Proposition 4.8 and Lemma 4.9 in Schied et al., 2017).
(i) There is at most one Nash equilibrium in the class of admissible strategies.
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(ii) A Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies is also a Nash equilibrium in the class
of admissible strategies.
The next step is to show that Nash equilibria are characterized by n+1 Fredholm integral equations of
the second kind. Existence of a Nash equilibrium then follows from the invertibility of the corresponding
integral operator.
For η ∈ Rn+1, let η denote the (n + 1)-dimensional constant function η(t) = η. With slight abuse of
notation, let 0 and 1 denote the (n+ 1)-dimensional constant functions 0(t) = (0, 0, . . . , 0) and 1(t) =
(1, 1, . . . , 1). Define a diagonal matrix Γ := diag(γ0, γ1, . . . , γn) and an operator F on L2([0, T ];Rn+1)
via
(Fα)(t) := Γα(t) +
(∫ t
0
G(t− s)α(s)>1(s) ds
)
1(t)
+
∫ T
t
G(s− t)α(s) ds.
(4)
The following lemma connects the operator F with equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 3. The function α∗ = (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n) ∈ L2([0, T ];Rn+1) is a Nash equilibrium in the class of
deterministic strategies if and only if
(i)
∫ T
0 α
∗
i (t) dt = xi for every i = 0, 1, . . . , n, and
(ii) there is an η = (η0, η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ Rn+1 such that (Fα∗)(t) = η for almost all t ∈ [0, T ].
In this case, ηixi ≥ Ji[α∗i |α∗−i] for every i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Remark 4. The optimality condition (Fα∗)(t) = η can be rewritten as
γiα
∗
i (t) +
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)α∗i (s) ds = ηi −
∫ t
0
G(t− s)
∑
j 6=i
α∗j (s) ds (5)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n. For fixed (α∗0, . . . , α∗i−1, α
∗
i+1, . . . , α
∗
n), this is a one-dimensional Fredholm integral
equation of the second kind. Fredholm integral equations are connected with the more prevalent Euler-
Lagrange equations in the following way: Consider the constant decay kernel G(t) = 1. Then for
admissible strategies α = (α0, α1, . . . , αn) the asset price evolves according to
S(t) =
∫ t
0
(
αi(s) +
∑
j 6=i
αj(s)
)
ds.
This turns the minimization of expected costs Ji[αi;α−i] into a classical problem in the calculus of
variations. The corresponding Euler-Lagrange equation characterizing the optimal strategy α∗i is
0 =
d
dt
[
γiα
∗
i + S
]− α∗i .
A straightforward calculation shows that this is the t-derivative of (5). But as soon as the decay kernel G
is not constant, the nonlocal term
∫ T
t G(s− t)α∗i (s) ds prevents the derivation of a “proper” (i.e., local)
Euler-Lagrange equation from (5). One might suspect that the minimization of expected costs can still
be performed with classical methods by considering the two-dimensional process (α∗i , S) instead of α
∗
i .
But S is a function of α∗i and a “chain rule” applies in the derivation of the Euler-Lagrange equation.
The additional term introduced by the chain rule is just
∫ T
t G(|t − s|)α∗i (s) ds (Avron, 2003). Hence
Fredholm integral equations, not Euler-Lagrange equations, are the appropriate tool for solving problems
of optimal execution under transient price impact.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies is now shown by proving that F
is invertible and invoking the uniqueness result from Lemma 2.
Theorem 5. There is a unique Nash equilibrium α∗ in the class of admissible strategies. It is deter-
ministic.
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Figure 1: Illustration of transient price impact with exponential decay G(t) = e−ρt. Asset price S(t)
for ρ = 1 (solid line), ρ = 0.5 (dashed line) and for permanent price impact ρ = 0 (dotted line).
Here, a single strategic investor trades at a constant rate α0(t) = −2 while t ≤ 1/2 and α0(t) = 0
while t > T/2. Parameters: n = 0, T = 1 and x0 = −1. Notice that α0 is admissible but not optimal.
Recall that Theorem 5 relies on the following assumptions: The decay kernel G is square-integrable,
G(0) is bounded and each investor incurs strictly positive transaction costs γi > 0. It seems likely that
the first two assumptions could be relaxed without affecting the result. In the single-investor case,
Schied and Strehle (2017) establish existence of an optimal strategy for all convex, nonincreasing and
integrable decay kernels (including those with a weak singularity limt→0G(t) =∞).
Assuming strictly positive transaction costs, however, is crucial. The single-investor case without
transaction costs is studied extensively by Gatheral et al. (2012). Here, optimal strategies need no
longer be absolutely continuous (i.e., the remaining net amount X∗ need not be differentiable), which
complicates the analysis considerably. The authors show that no optimal strategy exists for the Gaus-
sian decay kernel G(t) = e−t2 , although it is square-integrable and bounded (Example 2.16). Consider
also Theorem 4.5 in Schied et al. (2017), where the existence of a Nash equilibrium depends on the
level of transaction costs.
2 Transient price impact with exponential decay
To obtain an explicit representation of the Nash equilibrium, assume from now on that transient price
impact decays at an exponential rate, i.e., G(t) = e−ρt, as in Obizhaeva and Wang (2013) and Schied
et al. (2017). The parameter ρ > 0 determines the size and persistence of price impact. A small ρ
implies large impact and slow recovery (see Figure 1). The limit ρ = 0 corresponds to permanent price
impact as in Almgren and Chriss (2001).
In searching for a closed-form representation of the Nash equilibrium, it will turn out that the (n+ 2)-
dimensional function
ψ := (α0, α1, . . . , αn, S)
is a more natural object of study than α := (α0, α1, . . . , αn). Clearly, ψ determines α and vice versa.
With a slight abuse of terminology, the function ψ∗ = (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n, S∗) will also be called a Nash
equilibrium if α∗ := (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n) is a Nash equilibrium and S∗ = S(· ;α∗).
Notice that G is of positive type. Assume again γi > 0 for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Let α∗ = (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n)
be the unique Nash equilibrium (compare Lemma 2 and Theorem 5). It is deterministic and continuous.
Let η = (η0, η1, . . . , ηn) denote the corresponding vector for which Fα∗ = η (compare Lemma 3).
Finally, let S∗ := S( · ;α∗).
The following approach yields a closed-form representation of ψ∗ and thus of α∗. Rewrite the optimality
conditions in Lemma 3 as a system of integral equations:
γiα
∗
i (t) + S
∗(t) +
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)α∗i (s) ds = ηi, t ∈ [0, T ], (6)
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for i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
If all investors had homogeneous transaction costs γ0 = γ1 = · · · = γn, one could sum (6) over i
to obtain a two-dimensional system of differential equations characterizing
∑n
i=0 α
∗
i and S
∗. Once
this system were solved, (6) would reduce to n + 1 identical one-dimensional ordinary differential
equations. The model in Schied and Zhang (2015) allows for this approach. But if transaction costs
are heterogeneous, all functions α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n and S∗ must be computed simultaneously.
Let i = 0, 1, . . . , n. It is clear from (6) that α∗i is differentiable in t. Differentiating and plugging in
from (6) yields the ordinary differential equation
d
dt
α∗i = ρα
∗
i −
1
γi
∑
j 6=i
α∗j +
2ρ
γi
S∗ − ρηi
γi
. (7)
Furthermore, (1) shows that S∗ satisfies the ordinary differential equation
d
dt
S∗ =
n∑
i=0
α∗i − ρS∗. (8)
Combine (7) and (8) to conclude that the Nash equilibrium
ψ∗ := (α∗0, α
∗
1, . . . , α
∗
n, S
∗)
solves a system of differential equations of the form ddtψ
∗ = Mψ∗ + m, where M is a square matrix
and m is a vector.
Let eMt denote the matrix exponential of Mt. If M is invertible, then ψ∗ must be of the form ψ∗(t) =
eMtz −M−1m for some z ∈ Rn+2. Notice that the investors’ liquidation constraints translate into un-
usual boundary conditions for ψ∗: They apply to
∫ T
0 α
∗
i (t) dt, not α
∗
i . This complicates the calculation
of z.
The next theorem contains the closed-form representation of ψ∗. Define the (n+2)-dimensional square
matrices
M :=

ρ − 1γ0 · · · − 1γ0
2ρ
γ0
− 1γ1 ρ · · · − 1γ1
2ρ
γ1
...
...
. . .
...
...
− 1γn − 1γn · · · ρ
2ρ
γn
1 1 · · · 1 −ρ

and
N1 :=

ργ0 0 · · · 0 ρ
0 ργ1 · · · 0 ρ
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · ργn ρ
γ0 γ1 · · · γn n+ 1
 .
Define further the (n+ 1)× (n+ 2)-dimensional matrix
W :=

1 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 0

and the (n+ 2)-dimensional column vector v := (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1). For m ∈ N \ {0}, denote by Im the m-
dimensional identity matrix. Define the (n+ 2)-dimensional square block matrix
N2 :=
[
W
(
(M−1 +N1T )eMT −M−1
)
v>(In+1 +N1eMT )
]
.
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Figure 2: Remaining net amounts X∗0 (t) and X(t) for n = 0 (dotted line), n = 1 (solid line), n = 5
(dashed line) and n = 25 (dot-dashed line). Parameters: T = 1, ρ = 0.95, γ0 = γ1 = 0.1, x0 = −1 and
x1 = 0.
Theorem 6. The matrix N2 is invertible and it holds that
ψ∗(t) = (eMt +N1eMT )N−12 x˜, (9)
where x˜ := (x0, x1, . . . , xn, 0).
The Nash equilibrium (9) can be approximated numerically. The next section does so and studies how
opportunistic investors affect optimal strategies.
Remark 7. The approach that leads to Equation (9) does not generalize to other decay kernels. One
of the first steps is to differentiate the optimality condition (Fα∗)(t) = η. This yields
0 = (Fα∗)′(t) = γi
d
dt
α∗i (t) +
∫ t
0
G′(t− s)α∗i (s) ds−
∫ T
t
G′(s− t)α∗i (s) ds.
For exponential decay kernels, the relationship G′(t) = −ρG(t) leads to the ordinary differential equa-
tion (7). For all other decay kernels, it is unclear how to proceed.
Even in the single-investor case n = 0, closed-form solutions for non-exponential decay kernels are
challenging to derive (Schied and Strehle, 2017, Examples 6 and 7).
3 Economic analysis
Let n ≥ 1. Assume that investor 0 executes a net sell order x0 < 0, while all other investors i =
1, 2, . . . , n trade zero net amounts xi = 0. The case x0 > 0 is perfectly symmetric. Investors i =
1, 2, . . . , n will only trade if they can generate a profit (that is, negative costs) from the price impact
generated by investor 0. In this sense, they are opportunistic investors. Investor 0 will be referred to
as the liquidating investor.
Assume for simplicity that all opportunistic investors have identical levels of transaction costs, i.e., γ1 =
γ2 = · · · = γn. It follows from Lemma 2 that in equilibrium, all opportunistic investors pursue the
same strategy α∗1. Hence α :=
∑n
i=1 α
∗
i equals nα
∗
1.
For the subsequent analysis, it is most illustrative to study the remaining net amounts
X∗0 (t) = x0 −
∫ t
0
α∗0(s) ds and X(t) := −n
∫ t
0
α∗1(s) ds.
Figure 2 is representative of equilibrium strategies in general. Opportunistic investors engage in front-
running : They build up short positions in the beginning and buy back for the rest of the trading
period. The liquidating investor sells throughout the trading period, such that opportunistic investors
generate a profit from selling high and buying low. A larger number of opportunistic investors implies
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Figure 3: Total costs of the liquidating investor and sum of total (negative) costs of the opportunistic
investors in dependence of n; for γ1 = 0.1 (solid line), γ1 = 0.5 (dashed line) and γ1 = 1 (dotted line).
Parameters: T = 1, ρ = 0.1, γ0 = 1, x0 = −1 and x1 = 0.
more front-running shortly after t = 0. The liquidating investor reacts accordingly to avoid selling in
a falling market and shifts more trading activity to the end.
This pattern holds for many parameter combinations, but it is not universal: Simulations show that
if γ1 is small and ρ is large, opportunistic investors may start selling again shortly after T/2 such
that α changes sign three times.
Costs of execution
Front-running amplifies the liquidating investor’s price impact and increases his total costs significantly
(see Figure 3).
If opportunistic investors have low transaction costs, one or two of them suffice to fully realize the
profit potential of order anticipation. Further increasing n results in competition among opportunistic
investors, reducing their total profit and also reducing the liquidating investor’s total costs. This
is different if transaction costs are high. Transaction costs restrict the degree to which investors
can benefit from opportunistic trading. High transaction costs leave unrealized profit potential for
additional opportunistic investors. Consequently, the liquidating investor’s total costs increase in n.
Notice that while total profits of opportunistic investors generally increase in n, these profits are divided
(equally) among an increasing number of investors; each opportunistic investor earns less if n increases.
It is interesting that the liquidating investor’s costs rise significantly if γ1 decreases (at least for small n),
while simulations show that his optimal strategy hardly changes. This suggests that the liquidating
investor can do little to avoid exploitation from order anticipation strategies.
Asset price and price overshooting
Figure 4 shows that in the absence of opportunistic investors, the asset price decreases steadily over
time; it exhibits a persistent drift. This changes drastically once opportunistic investors enter the
picture, especially if there are many of them. Opportunistic investors build up short positions very
quickly, causing a sudden price drop right after t = 0. The asset price remains almost constant
afterwards. This seems to support claims about opportunistic investors improving price discovery:
The price drop caused by the order x0 occurs earlier and more quickly (see Sections 6.2 and 6.3 in
Benos and Sagade, 2012, for a discussion). But inferences about price discovery are outside the scope
of this model because all liquidation constraints are known to all investors.
Consider the maximum deviation of the asset price,
Σ := sup
t∈[0,T ]
|S(t)− S(0)|.
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Figure 4: Asset price S(t) for n = 0 (solid line), n = 1 (dashed line), n = 5 (dot-dashed line) and n = 25
(dotted line). Parameters: T = 1, ρ = 0.95, γ0 = 1, γ1 = 0.1, x0 = −1 and x1 = 0.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) claim that opportunistic investors cause price overshooting, i.e.,
that Σ is larger for n ≥ 1 than for n = 0. They argue that this may lead to a domino effect: The price
drop caused by the liquidating investor and amplified by the opportunistic investors triggers additional
sell orders (for instance from pending stop-loss orders). This causes an even more extreme price drop,
triggering further sell orders, etc.
The model of price impact in which Brunnermeier and Pedersen observe price overshooting only fea-
tures temporary and permanent price impact. Both impose few constraints on the opportunistic traders
and generate little feedback from opportunistic traders to the liquidating trader. Consequently, oppor-
tunistic traders trade aggressively and scale their strategies to an exogenously given maximum size.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen arrive at a grim picture in which “predators” (opportunistic traders) exploit
“distressed traders” (liquidating investors) and may even cause a “panic” (the domino effect described
above). Price overshooting is also observed by Oehmke (2014), again in a model with temporary and
permanent price impact only.
Figure 5 shows that in the present model, price overshooting is the exception, not the rule: In general, Σ
decreases if n increases. This is most evident for markets with a “short memory”, i.e., for large values
of ρ. A possible explanation is that the price overshooting observed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen is a
consequence of permanent (or long-lived transient) price impact, rather than an inherent consequence
of opportunistic trading.
Another possible explanation is that quadratic transaction costs prevent price overshooting. Quadratic
costs imply that a (statistical) arbitrage strategy cannot be scaled indefinitely without becoming un-
profitable. As n increases, competition among opportunistic investors increases, and transaction costs
increasingly work against them. Figure 5 shows, however, that there is no obvious relationship be-
tween Σ and the level γ1 of transaction costs.
4 Heterogeneous time horizons
Opportunistic investors do not necessarily have the same time horizon as the liquidating investor.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1991) point out that the liquidating investor may preannounce his liquidation
constraint: “By informing potential traders who can take the other side of the preannounced orders
and by allowing the market to prepare to absorb these orders, preannouncement facilitates the match
between the demand and supply of liquidity in the market” (p. 444). This practice is known as
sunshine trading. It can be implemented by demanding that the liquidating investor only trade after
some time T0 > 0, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
In their analysis of sunshine trading, Schöneborn and Schied (2009) argue that opportunistic investors
may also have additional time to unwind their position after the liquidating investor has fully executed
his order. This can be implemented in the model by demanding that the liquidating investor only
trade until some time T1 < T .
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Figure 5: Maximum deviation Σ of the asset price for ρ = 0.95 (top) and ρ = 0.1 (bottom) and
for γ1 = 0.1 (solid line), γ1 = 0.25 (dashed line), γ1 = 0.5 (dot-dashed line) and γ1 = 1 (dotted line).
Parameters: T = 1, γ0 = 1, x0 = −1 and x1 = 0.
Consequently, divide [0, T ] into three periods: The acquisition period [0, T0], the main period [T0, T1]
and the unwinding period [T1, T ]. Suppose for now that T0 and T1 are fixed. The liquidating investor
is only allowed to trade during the main period. Opportunistic investors begin and end with a flat
inventory X1(0) = X1(T ) = 0. They use the acquisition period to build up a position X1(T0), then
trade alongside the liquidating investor during the main period. At the end of the main period, they
hold a position X1(T1), which they liquidate in the unwinding period. Notice that in equilibrium, all
opportunistic investors still behave identically.
Given X1(T0), the acquisition period is described by the model in Section 1, where investors i =
1, 2, . . . , n acquire identical amounts x1 = x2 = · · · = xn = X1(T0) over the time horizon [0, T0].
Theorem 6 yields the equilibrium strategies.
During the main and the liquidation period, the situation is more complicated. The model by
Schöneborn and Schied features linear temporary and permanent price impact. This has the com-
putational advantage that price impact generated during earlier periods does not affect equilibrium
strategies in subsequent periods. With transient price impact, trades from earlier periods cause a
(deterministic) price drift in subsequent periods. During the main period, the asset price becomes
S(t) = e−ρ(t−T0)S(T0) +
∫ t
T0
e−ρ(t−s)
n∑
i=0
αi(s) ds, t ∈ [T0, T1].
In the same way, price impact from the main period generates a price drift during the liquidation
period. Theorem 6 must be generalized by replacing S with
S˜(t) := e−ρ(t−τ0)s+ S(t), t ∈ [τ0, τ1],
for (τ0, τ1) ∈ {(T0, T1), (T1, T )} and s ∈ R. Repeating the arguments from Section 1, one sees that the
Nash equilibrium ψ∗ still satisfies a system of differential equations of the form ddtψ
∗ = Mψ∗+m, but
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now m = m(t) is not constant. Once this system is solved, one may calculate the optimal strategies for
the liquidating investor during the main period, and for the opportunistic investors during the main
and liquidation periods, in dependence of X1(T0) and X1(T1). This yields the total (negative) costs
for opportunistic investors over the entire time horizon [0, T ] in dependence of X1(T0) and X1(T1). It
remains to minimize these costs over (X1(T0), X1(T1)) ∈ R2.
But go one step further. In the current setting, a liquidating investor engaging in sunshine trading
may not only announce his liquidation constraint x0, but also his time horizon [T0, T1]. Schöneborn and
Schied show that a shorter trading horizon T1 < T can be beneficial to the liquidating investor in certain
market conditions. Although there may be an exogenous upper bound on T1, it is reasonable to assume
that the liquidating investor can voluntarily commit to a shorter trading horizon. The liquidating
investor also has some control over T0 because he can choose the time of announcement t = 0. Hence T0
and T1 should not be seen as fixed. One should rather perform a final optimization over (T0, T1) ∈ R2,
this time minimizing the liquidating investor’s total costs during the main period.
This extension promises interesting results, with opportunistic investors possibly engaging in liquidity
provision instead of front-running, as observed by Schöneborn and Schied (2009).
5 Conclusion
Order anticipation strategies try to benefit from a large order’s price impact. Since these strategies
initially trade in the same direction as the large order, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) suspect
them to cause price overshooting. Linking opportunistic trading with increased (or reduced) price
overshooting would serve as a strong argument for (or against) the harmfulness of order anticipation
strategies.
This paper analyzes order anticipation strategies in a theoretical framework. A multi-investor model
of optimal execution under transient price impact is introduced and shown to admit a unique Nash
equilibrium if trading incurs quadratic transaction costs. For the special case of exponentially decaying
price impact, the Nash equilibrium is derived in closed form. Numerical simulations show that while
order anticipation strategies raise the costs of executing a large order significantly, price overshooting
typically does not occur.
The current model differs from the model by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) in two ways: Price
impact is transient, not permanent; and trading incurs quadratic transaction costs. It is an open
question which of these differences is responsible for the absence of price overshooting.
Further theoretical research should determine for what types of price impact and transaction costs price
overshooting occurs; and empirical research is necessary to study the influence of order anticipation
strategies in real financial markets.
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.
Define the linear subspace B := {β ∈ L2[0, T ] | ∫ T0 β(t) dt = 0}.
Necessity: Suppose α∗ = (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n) is a Nash equilibrium in the class of deterministic strategies.
Let i = 0, 1, . . . , n. For every y ∈ R and β ∈ B, the function α∗i + yβ is a deterministic admissible
strategy for investor i. It follows that a necessary condition for the optimality of α∗i is
0 =
d
dy
Ji[α
∗
i + yβ |α∗−i]
∣∣∣∣
y=0
=
∫ T
0
(
β(t)
(
γiα
∗
i (t) + S(t;α
∗)
)
+
∫ t
0
G(t− s)α∗i (t)β(s) ds
)
dt.
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Conclude with Fubini’s theorem that
0 =
∫ T
0
β(t)
(
γiα
∗
i (t) +
∫ t
0
G(t− s)
n∑
i=0
α∗i (s) ds+
∫ T
t
G(s− t)α∗i (s)
)
ds
=
∫ T
0
β(t)(Fα∗)i(t) dt.
The fundamental lemma of the calculus of variations (see, e.g., Lemma 2 in Gelfand and Fomin, 1963)
implies that (Fα∗)i is constant for almost all t ∈ [0, T ].
Sufficiency: Let α∗ = (α∗0, α∗1, . . . , α∗n) be such that for every i = 0, 1, . . . , n, the liquidation con-
straint
∫ T
0 α
∗
i (t) dt = xi is satisfied and (Fα
∗)i(t) = ηi for almost all t ∈ [0, T ] for some η =
(η0, η1, . . . , ηn) ∈ Rn+1.
Let i = 0, 1, . . . , n. The liquidation constraint implies that any deterministic admissible strategy αi for
investor i can be written as αi = α∗i + β for some β ∈ B. Conclude with Fubini’s theorem that
Ji[αi |α∗−i] = J [α∗i |α∗−i] + ηi
∫ T
0
β(t) dt
+
1
2
∫ T
0
(
γiβ(t)
2 +
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)β(t)β(s) ds
)
dt
≥ J [α∗i |α∗−i].
Hence α∗i is the optimal strategy for investor i given that the other investors pursue α
∗
−i. This is true
for all i, showing that α∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n,
Ji[α
∗
i |α∗−i] =
∫ T
0
(γi
2
α∗i (t)
2 + α∗i (t)
∫ t
0
G(t− s)
n∑
j=0
α∗j (s) ds
)
dt
=
∫ T
0
α∗i (t)(Fα
∗)i(t) dt
− 1
2
∫ T
0
α∗i (t)
(
γiα
∗
i (t) +
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)α∗i (s) ds
)
dt
≤ ηixi.
Proof of Theorem 5.
Uniqueness is established by Lemma 2(i).
Define F as in (4). Let 〈·, ·〉 denote the L2-inner product on [0, T ], and ‖·‖ its induced norm. Without
loss of generality, assume γ0 ≤ γi ≤ γn for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n.
Conclude with the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and Jensen’s inequality that F is bounded: For every α ∈
L2([0, T ];Rn+1),
‖Fα‖
≤ ‖Γα‖+
(∫ T
0
(∫ t
0
G(t− s)
n∑
i=0
αi(s) ds
)2
(n+ 1) dt
)1/2
+
( n∑
i=0
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
G(s− t)αi(s) ds
)2
dt
)1/2
≤ γn‖α‖+ (n+ 2)
(∫ T
0
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)2 ds dt
)1/2‖α‖.
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Recall that G is square-integrable. Furthermore, apply Fubini’s theorem and recall that G is of positive
type to see that
〈Fα, α〉 =
n∑
i=0
γi
∫ T
0
αi(t)
2 dt
+
1
2
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)
n∑
i=0
αi(t)
n∑
i=0
αi(s) dsdt
+
1
2
n∑
i=0
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
G(|t− s|)αi(t)αi(s) ds dt
≥ γ0‖α‖2.
Hence F is also bounded from below. The adjoint F ∗ of F is given by
(F ∗α)(t) = Γα(t) +
(∫ T
t
G(s− t)α(s)>1(s) ds
)
1(t) +
∫ t
0
G(t− s)α(s) ds.
The same arguments as before show that F ∗ is bounded from above and below. Conclude that F is
invertible: Boundedness from below implies ker(F ) = {0}, showing that F is injective; and range(F ) =
ker(F ∗)⊥ = {0}⊥, showing that F is surjective.
Now define a linear operator A : Rn+1 → Rn+1 via
Aη :=
∫ T
0
(F−1η)(t) dt.
It follows from the calculations above that
η>Aη = 〈η, F−1η〉 ≥ γ0‖F−1η‖2.
Since ker(F−1) = {0}, conclude that η>Aη = 0 if and only if η = (0, 0, . . . , 0). Hence A is invertible.
For given liquidation constraints x, define η := A−1x and α∗ := F−1η. Then α∗ is a Nash equilibrium
in the class of deterministic strategies by Lemma 3: First,
∫ T
0 α
∗(t) dt = Aη = x; second, Fα∗ = η.
By Lemma 2, it is the unique Nash equilibrium in the class of admissible strategies.
Proof of Theorem 6.
A function ψ = (α0, α1, . . . , αn, S) ∈ L2([0, T ];Rn+2) shall be called regular if for each i = 0, 1, . . . , n,
the function αi is a deterministic admissible strategy for investor i, and S = S(· ;α) is the asset price
corresponding to α := (α0, α1, . . . , αn).
Define the (n+ 1)× (n+ 2)-dimensional matrices
U :=

γ0 0 . . . 0 1
0 γ1 . . . 0 1
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . γn 1
 and V :=

ρ
γ0
0 . . . 0 0
0 ργ1 . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . ργn 0
 .
The proof is in four steps.
1. ψ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is regular, continuously differentiable and solves the system
of differential equations
d
dt
ψ = Mψ − V >y, (10)
where y = Uψ(T ).
Necessity: Let ψ be a Nash equilibrium. It is clear from (6) and (8) that ψ is continuously differentiable.
Let t = T in (6) to obtain y = Uψ(T ). From (7) and (8), deduce (10).
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Sufficiency: Let ψ = (α0, α1, . . . , αn, S) be regular and suppose it solves (10) with y = Uψ(T ). Let α :=
(α0, α1, . . . , αn). Fix i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Define
fi(t) :=
∫ T
t
eρ(t−s)αi(s) ds.
Clearly, the derivative f ′i satisfies f
′
i = ρfi−αi. Let gi := ηi−γiαi−S.With (10) conclude g′i = ρgi−αi.
Hence f ′i − g′i = ρ(fi− gi). Applying the boundary condition y = Uψ(T ) shows that fi(T )− gi(T ) = 0.
It follows that fi = gi and
(Fα)i = γiαi + S + fi = γiαi + S + gi = ηi.
This is true for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Hence ψ is a Nash equilibrium by Lemma 3.
2. M is invertible.
Define the (n+ 2)-dimensional column vectors
v1 :=
(
ρ+
1
γ0
, ρ+
1
γ1
, . . . , ρ+
1
γn
,−1
2
)
, v2 :=
(
− 1
γ0
,− 1
γ1
, . . . ,− 1
γn
, 1
)
,
v3 := (1, 1, . . . , 1,−2ρ), u := (1, 1, . . . , 1).
Then M = (diag(v1) + v2u>) diag(v3) and, by the matrix determinant lemma,
detM = −ρ
(
1 +
n∑
i=0
1
ργi + 1
) n∏
i=0
(
ρ+
1
γi
)
6= 0.
3. ψ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is regular and there is a z ∈ Rn+2 such that
ψ(t) = (eMt +N1e
MT )z. (11)
The general solution of (10) is eMtz+M−1V >y for z ∈ Rn+2. By Step 1, the condition y = U(eMT z+
M−1V >y) must be satisfied. The matrix M − V >U is nonsingular, which can be verified by checking
that (M − V >U)−1 = (N1 − vv>)/ρ. By the Woodbury matrix identity,
(In+1 − UM−1V >)−1 = In+1 + U(M − V >U)−1V >.
Hence
y = (In+1 + U(M − V >U)−1V >)UeMT z.
It holds that V >U(In+2 +N1) = MN1, or equivalently, (M − V >U)−1V >U = N1. With this, obtain
M−1V >y = M−1V >U(In+2 +N1)eMT z = N1eMT z.
4. Once ψ is defined by (11), integrating over [0, T ] shows that ψ is regular if and only if N2z = x˜. It
remains to show that N2 is invertible. Although this follows from Theorem 5, a separate proof is given
here.
Consider the case where all investors must trade zero net amounts, i.e., x = (0, 0, . . . , 0). It is easy
to check that in this case, ψ0 := 0 is a Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 2(ii), this is the only Nash
equilibrium. According to Step 3, there exists a z0 ∈ Rn+2 such that ψ0(t) = (eMt + N1eMT )z0.
This shows that (0, 0, . . . , 0) = ddtψ
0(t) = MeMtz0 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. The matrix MeMt is invertible,
hence z0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0). It follows that the equationN2z = (0, 0, . . . , 0) has only the trivial solution z0 =
(0, 0, . . . , 0), so N2 is invertible.
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